Implications of integration for wage formation and employment by Kalmbach, Peter
Evangelisches Studienwerk e.V. 
 
 
 
Schriftenreihe des Promotionsschwerpunkts  
Makroökonomische Diagnosen und Therapien der Arbeitslosigkeit 
 
 
No. 9/1999 
 
 
 
 
Implications of Integration for Wage Formation and 
Employment 
 
 
by 
 
 
Peter Kalmbach 
 
 
 
 
Stuttgart-Hohenheim 
ISSN 1436 – 1655  
 Implications of Integration for Wage Formation and 
Employment 
 
by 
 
Peter Kalmbach 
 
 
Universität Bremen 
FB7 – Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
IKSF 
Haferwende 10a 
D-28357 Bremen 
pkalm@uni-bremen.de 
 
  
  
 
Contents: 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................1 
2. Experts’ Recommendations for Wage Policy .........................................5 
3. Effects of Integration for Wages and Employment ................................9 
4. Some Concluding Remarks...................................................................19 
Literature..........................................................................................................20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lecture given at the University of Hohenheim, 12 May 1999 
  - 1 - 
1. Introduction 
The obvious effect of integration in the form of a monetary union is that exchange 
rates are irrevocably fixed. Seen from the perspective of Tinbergen’s theory of eco-
nomic policy, formulated many years ago, this means that the participating coun-
tries forego using an instrument which formerly was available to them. As is well 
known, economists do not agree at all with respect to the question on how risky the 
establishment of a monetary union is, in which the national countries will still be 
the rulers of the game. They were only able to agree to handing over the responsi-
bility for monetary policy to an independent organisation. Non German countries 
were mainly motivated by the idea that it may be less disadvantageous to have 
some voice in a common central bank than to follow - grinding one’s teeth - the 
policy of the German Bundesbank, in which unconditional devotees to price stabil-
ity were traditionally leading.  
Whereas it is clear that the single currency rules out the flexibility that intra-
European exchange rates provided - and in this respect it is the cancellation of a 
potential shock absorber - less obvious is what happens with interest rates and with 
changes in the price level. As far as interest rates are concerned, it is only certain 
that those set by the European Central Bank are binding for all members. But some 
differences will still exist in the debit and credit interest rates in different countries 
which will increase when some insecurity arises about the continuation of the 
membership of one of the participants. Changes in the price levels can also differ 
because non-tradeable goods exist. But notwithstanding these possible differences 
it should be quite clear that the possibilities to establish a national policy for interest 
rates or for changes in the price level will be drastically reduced in a monetary un-
ion. 
In view of these conditions something like a substitute for this loss should be made 
available. The traditional view is quite unequivocal with regard to the question of 
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what the best substitute is. According to the opinion of most economists, politicians 
and central bankers,  the loss of flexibility, due to the fixing of exchange rates, has 
to be compensated above all in the labour market. According to the same opinion 
leaders this is admittedly exactly the place where most of the members and espe-
cially countries like Germany, France and Italy are lacking in flexibility. 
That labour markets, their functioning and especially their flexibility will become 
much more important under the new regulations, is a widespread opinion1. A com-
pelling question is thus how wage policy will probably react to the new situation 
and what may be the consequences.  
Before I elaborate, let me mention an effect of the monetary union which has not 
been discussed as intensively as the loss of the possibility to adjust exchange rates. 
That is, under the new conditions collective bargaining will much more than before 
determine the real wage. At least for a decentralised wage policy this will be clear 
to participants because they can not expect the European Central Bank to adapt to 
the respective wage policy. Therefore under the new conditions an old demand of 
traditional economists will be fulfilled much more than before: that the responsibil-
ity for wages and employment should rest with the participants of the bargaining 
process. 
The most interesting question is of course how wage policy will react with respect 
to these new circumstances. Answering this question requires distinguishing be-
tween at least two dimensions. The first is concerned with the distinction between a 
centralised (Europeanised) wage policy, on the one hand, and a decentralised wage 
policy (country-specific or at regional, sectoral or even firm level), on the other. 
Centralisation of wage policy is not necessarily one and the same as an undifferen-
tiated and uniform wage policy for all members. But to Europeanise wage policy 
                                               
1
 In Germany this was expressed already in 1989 by the Academic Advisory Board of the 
Ministry of Trade and Commerce (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft 1989). 
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would of course establish forms of co-ordination and maybe of co-operation be-
tween trade unions as well as employers’ associations. The danger of wage policies 
in the spirit of beggar-my-neighbour policies, which will be mentioned in the fol-
lowing, would most probably be reduced under these conditions. 
The other dimension of wage policy - of importance for its centralised and decen-
tralised variants - is its basic orientation. Collective agreements for single member 
countries (or for regions or branches) can be the result of different strategies of un-
ions2: 
1. Trade unions could accept their increased responsibility for the employment 
situation and attempt to insure that an average unit labour costs in the respective 
sphere of influence of a trade union do not increase at a higher rate than elsewhere. 
Nominal wage rates would thus be increased in accordance with the rate of growth 
of labour productivity and the unavoidable rate of inflation. This means at the same 
time that the considerable differences in the levels of labour productivity (see Table 
1) would be accepted and a catching-up of low-productivity countries would only 
take place if they were able to realize higher growth rates in labour productivity. 
                                               
2
 Of course, the strategies of employers’ associations also matter. Nevertheless, the emphasis in 
the paper is put on trade unions’ strategies. 
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Table 1       
  
Labour Productivity and Labour Costs in Euroland, 1997 
      
      
 Labour productivity a Labour productivity in 
percent of West 
Germany 
Labour costs level b Labour costs level in 
percent of West Germany 
Unemployment 
rate c 
      
      
Austria 54,5                   90,9                 30,7                    89,5                   4,4                 
Belgium 58,5                   97,6                 36,9                  107,6                   9,2                 
Finland 48,8                   81,4                 32,2                    93,8                 14,0                 
France 57,2                   95,3                 32,8                    95,6                 12,4                 
Germany 55,7                   92,9                 32,7                    95,3                   9,7                 
 -West Germany 60,0                 100,0                 34,3                 100,0                    8,3                 
 -East Germany 36,2                   60,4                 25,5                   74,4                 15,7                 
Ireland 41,7                   69,5                 24,6                   71,8                 10,2                 
Italy 51,1                   85,3                 27,4                   79,9                 12,1                 
Netherlands 51,2                   85,4                 33,4                   94,4                   5,2                 
Portugal 20,7                   34,5                 12,8                   37,4                   6,8                 
Spain 37,2                   62,0                 23,0                   66,9                 20,8                 
United Kingdom 43,0                   71,7                 23,3                   68,0                   7,1                 
      
      
a
 Nominal GDP per person engaged (total employment) (thousand ECU, calculated with the actual central rate). 
b Gross compensation of employees (wage and salary earners) per employee (wage and salary earner) (thousand ECU, 
     calculated with the actual central rate).   
 
c Standardised, OECD; for East and West Germany: own calculations.  
      
Source: Siebert (1998)     
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2. An intensified (or even perverted) form of job competition between national (or 
regional, sectoral) trade unions could take place when some of them accept nomi-
nal wage increases distinctly below the increase of labour productivity with the in-
tention to increase international competitiveness and - hopefully - the rate of em-
ployment in its own sphere of influence. As it is obviously not possible for every 
country to reduce its unit labour costs in relation to other countries this form of 
wage policy would finally fail. But the danger exists that it may give rise to a defla-
tionary development. A negative sum game would be the consequence. 
3. If trade unions ask for wage increases considerably above the increase of labour 
productivity, it must have been taken into account by them that competitiveness 
and employment may deteriorate as a result of such wage policy, while hoping that 
the European Union prevent (or at least finance) an increase in unemployment and 
give support in the form of fiscal transfers. The obvious recent historical example 
for this sort of behaviour is the wage policy practised in Eastern Germany follow-
ing unification. 
2. Experts’ Recommendations for Wage Policy 
To give an idea of what sort of recommendation traditional economics has to offer 
for wage policy I will very shortly refer to the recommendation for wage policy as 
proposed by the German Council of Economic Experts. The general idea is that 
wage rates should be changed in accordance with the change in labour productivity 
but that this rule has to be modified in view of unemployment. According to the 
Council and other influential economists the increase of wage rates has to be below 
the increase in productivity if unemployment is to be reduced. Additionally the 
Council (Sachverständigenrat 1997) has recently developed a remarkable interpre-
tation of the specific rate of productivity growth which matters for wage policy. 
They propose a modified rate of productivity growth which deviates from the 
measured rate of growth in a two-fold way: first the so-called dismissal productiv-
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ity - or more precisely, the productivity increase due to a reduction of employment 
- is deducted. Second based on the maxim in neo-classical theory that marginal and 
not average productivity is important, the rate of change in marginal productivity 
(modified in the same way) should instruct wage policy.  
Since statistics about marginal productivities and its rate of change do not exist and 
the productivity increase due to employment reductions is unknown, the Council 
has developed the following procedure to derive the rate which he considers to be 
relevant for wage policy. 
A modified Cobb-Douglas function of the following form is used: 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Y t L t K t et t t= α β λ  
              Y: real production α : production elasticity of labour 
               L: labour input β : production elasticity of capital 
               K: capital stock λ : Hicks-neutral technological progress 
For this form of a production function the relation between the rates of change of 
marginal and average labour productivity is 
(2)     δ
δ
α
Y
L
Y
L



 = +




∧
∧
∧
 
As (2) shows, only a change in α  can produce different rates of change in the two 
rates if a Cobb-Douglas function is assumed3. 
To 
 
correct
 
 for dismissal the following procedure is adopted. The productivity func-
tion (Y/L) which can be derived from (1) is differentiated logarithmically to arrive 
at: 
(3)     ( )
∧
⋅ ∧ ⋅ ∧


 = + − + + +
Y
L
L L K Kα α β β λln ln1  
As (α -1) is according to neo-classical assumptions negative, the second term on 
the right side will be positive when employment shrinks. This is one and the same 
                                               
3
 As is well known, in the original Cobb-Douglas function the exponents of L and K are fixed 
and independent of time. Rates of change in marginal and average productivity are therefore 
  - 7 - 
as the assertion that the measured growth rate of labour productivity contains in the 
case of employment decline a contribution due to dismissals - sometimes called 
  dismissal productivity  4. 
If this part is not taken into account one gets the modified rate  
(4)     
∧
⋅ ∧  = + + +
Y
L
L K K
*
ln lnα β β λ  
and therefore 
(5)     ( )
∧ ∧
∧  =   + −
Y
L
Y
L L
*
1 α  
When the same correction is made for the rate of change in marginal productivity 
the following expression for the rate of change of   modified marginal productivity 
of labour    can be derived: 
(6)     ( )
∧ ∧
∧ ∧  =   + − +
δ
δ α
Y
L
Y
L
a L
*
1  
Table 2 shows that in the periods under consideration there are remarkable differ-
ences between measured productivity growth and the growth rate of marginal pro-
ductivity constructed in this way. As the measured productivity growth and the rate 
of growth of productivity, corrected for dismissal’s contribution, are very similar, 
the difference is mainly due to a decline in α , which in the calculations is identified 
with the labour share5. Hence, the approach of the Council has the somewhat para-
doxical consequence that a fall in the labour share unavoidably reduces the wage 
increase recommended. When (6) is used to calculate the appropriate change in the 
wage rate a decline in labour’s share results in lower wage increases and therefore a 
further fall in its share. 
                                                                                                                                                   
one and the same. 
4
 It is obviously a rate of change which contributes to productivity growth. 
5
 To equalize α , the production elasticity of labour, with the labour share there are some 
prerequisites: for example, the assumption of perfect markets and constant returns to scale. 
Obviously (see equation (1)) the Council was of the opinion that the assumption of constant 
returns is not necessary. 
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Table 2 
                                        Rates of Change of Labour Productivity and Marginal Productivity 
                                                                                    (West Germany) 
 
 
 
 
Period 
 
Average Rate 
of Change in 
Labour Pro-
ductivity, un-
modified 
 
Average Rate 
of Change in 
Labour Vol-
ume 
 
 
Wage Share1) 
Average Rate 
of Change in 
Labour Pro-
ductivity, mo-
dified 
 
Average Rate 
of Change in 
Wage Share1)2) 
 
 
 
 
Rate of Change in 
Marginal Productiv-
ity 
 
 
 
I. Longer Periods 
 
 
1980-92 2,7 -0,2 64,3 2,7 -0,8 1,9 
1982-93 2,9 -0,2 64,6 2,8 -0,8 2,0 
 
 
 
II. 1998 
 
 
1998 2 ½ ¾ 58,9 2 ¾ -1 1 ¾ 
 
 
1)
 Wage share includes calculated compensations for self-employed persons and uses in the denominator gross value added. 
2)
 For the last row in the table: 1988-98. 
 
Source: Sachverständigenrat (1998) 
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I forego to discuss the problematic features of this recommendation in more detail. 
Despite the Council’s intention to provide for a scientifically substantiated basis for 
wage policy, it might have the unintended effect of contributing to the aforemen-
tioned intensified or even perverted form of job competition between nations which 
triggers the changes leading to a deflationary downward spiral. 
In what follows I will not discuss the probability of such a development but take up 
a question which is not put forward and therefore obviously also not answered by 
the Council. It is the question how trade unions and employers’ associations are 
affected by integration. As the Council gives its recommendation unconditioned it 
has to be inferred that it is applicable to a pre- and post-integration situation. But it 
is obviously naive to give recommendations for wage policy without taking into 
account the interests of the actors. With the use of an extremely simplified model I 
will try to overcome this naiveté — whereas I am by no means aware of the danger 
that I may be revealing a naiveté of a different nature. 
3. Effects of Integration for Wages and Employment 
Up to now I have not taken into account explicitly that wages are settled by collec-
tive agreements between trade unions and employers’ associations. An important 
aspect of international market integration consists in the fact that generally market 
structure as well as market size will be changed in comparison to the pre-existing 
situation. I will, admittedly under very simplifying assumptions, in what follows 
discuss how the bargaining outcome is affected. To be more specific, my concern is 
how goods market integration affects wages, employment and profits. 
My point of departure is a situation with two initially separate markets A and B, 
each of which consists of a unionised sector comprising a monopolistic firm (which 
is one and the same as an employers’ association) and a trade union which is the 
sole supplier of labour to the firm. It is assumed that firms maximise profits, that 
the products are perfect substitutes, that costs consist only in wages and that pro-
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duction functions are linear. Additionally it is assumed that the market under con-
sideration is small and that price changes in this market do therefore not influence 
the general price level. 
Under these assumptions the profit function is  
(7)     Πi  = pX w Li i i−  
          with  i = A, B 
              w = wage rate in the unionised sector 
              X = production 
The linear production functions are: 
(8)      X LA A= α  
           X LB B= β  
            with 0 <β  ≤ α  
β  < α  indicates that productivity in B is lower than in A. In Huizinga (1993), 
whose model has in other respects many similarities with our model, only α β=  is 
discussed. I will in addition also investigate the case in which the two markets are 
not fully symmetric. 
As far as trade unions are concerned, the usual procedure in the respective literature 
is now to define an objective function of the union which has to be maximised. Dif-
ferent functions have been proposed (see, for example, Oswald 1985, Booth 1995). 
I will neither enter into a discussion about the meaningfulness of such an objective 
function for an organisation with members of different interests nor into the pros 
and cons of different forms. I will simply assume that the union tries to maximise 
its rent, i.e. the difference between the wage rate in the unionised and the competi-
tive sector of the economy multiplied by the number of persons employed in the 
unionised sector. For simplicity I assume that the competitive wage is zero. In that 
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case maximising the rent is one and the same as maximising the wage sum. There-
fore 
(9)     U w Li i i=  
               i = A, B 
Finally, I assume that the monopolistic and unionised sector in each country is 
small enough that its price does not influence the price level and that the monopoly 
firms in A and B have identical and linear negatively sloped demand functions for 
its products of the form 
(10)    p a bXi= −  
In the standard monopoly union model the union fixes the wage rate according to 
its objective function and accepts the respective employment decision of the firm. 
As has been shown by McDonald and Solow (1981), preceded by Leontief (1946), 
the equilibrium in the monopoly model is in general inefficient as the outcome does 
not lie on the bargaining contract curve. 
In our context we have to ask what the pre-integration and the post-integration 
solution will be. Let us first turn to the question on which solution we arrive at in 
the pre-integration situation. 
The union in every country knows that wage rates and labour demand are nega-
tively correlated because the profit of a country’s monopoly ( Πi ) can be defined as 
follows: 
(11)   ( )Πi i i ia bX Xi w L= − −
−
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and for profit maximising firms the following labour demand functions in the two 
countries can be derived:6 
(12)   L a w
bA
A
=
−α
α2 2
 
(13)   L a w
bB
B
=
−β
β2 2  
The functions to be maximised by the unions with respect to the wage rate are 
therefore 
(14)   U a w w
bA
A A
=
−α
α
2
22
 
and 
(15)  U a w w
bB
B B
=
−β
β
2
22
 
Solutions for the optimal wage rates are 
(16)    w aA* = α2  
(17)    w aB* = β2  
and for the respective labour demands 
(18)    L a
bA
*
=
4 α
 
(19)    L a
bB
*
=
4 β  
                                               
6
 By inserting (8) and (10) into the respective profit function and making use of the necessary 
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Ui
*
, p*  and Πi*  are independent of the productivity parameters and therefore identi-
cal for A and B: 
(20)    U a
bi
*
=
2
8
 
(21)    p a* = 3
4
 
(22) Πi a b
*
=
2
16
 
Let us now turn to the post-integration constellation. We exclude labour mobility7, 
but firms are now competitors in one single market. After integration, firms are as-
sumed to be engaged in Cournot output competition, i.e. the output of the competi-
tor is assumed to be fixed and independent of one’s own output. As far as the un-
ions are concerned, when setting the wage rate, they take into account how labour 
demand will react, whereas the wage rate of the other union is taken as given. Co-
operation between unions and firms does not take place8. 
Under the new conditions the demand curve one gets by horizontal addition is 
(23)  ( )p a b L LA B= − +2 α β . 
Starting again from the profit maximisation condition, the labour demand functions 
of the two firms can be derived: 
(24) L
b
a
w w
A
A B**
= − +




2
3
2
α α β  
                                                                                                                                                   
conditions for profit maximization ( )d dLi iΠ / = 0  under the assumption of a parametrically 
given wage rate. 
7
 In the European Union we will of course have some labour mobility. But there are good 
reasons to assume that it will be much lower than in the United States. For a drastically 
simplified model it seems appropriate to neglect mobility completely. 
8
 We will later take up the consequences of a change in these assumptions. 
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and 
(25)  L
b
a
w w
B
B A**
= − +




2
3
2
β β α . 
As can be seen, labour demand is (as before) inversely related to the wage rate of 
the respective country and (now additionally) positive to the foreign wage rate. The 
last mentioned influence shows that a positive employment externally exists. 
Maximising its objective functions the trade unions determine their optimal wage 
rates which are: 
(26)   w aA** = α3  
(27)    w aB** = β3  
A comparison of (26) and (27) with (16) and (17) shows that wage rates are lower 
than in the pre-integration situation. But, as can be seen by inserting these wage 
rates into the labour demand functions, labour demand and therefore employment is 
higher: 
(28)    L a
bA
**
=
4
9α
 
(29)    L a
bB
**
=
4
9β  
Finally, it is easy to check that trade unions’ objective functions exhibit a larger 
value than in the pre-integration situation.9 And although the price is lower after 
integration profits, too, are higher after integration. The somewhat surprising result 
is therefore that in the case under discussion trade unions’ rents (under our assump-
                                               
9
 The solutions for the different variables are summarized in Table 3. 
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tions one and the same as the wage sum), profits and employment are higher in the 
integrated market.  
Before discussing these results we should remember that some very special as-
sumptions had been made which may be questioned. Between the European coun-
tries obviously important pre-integration differences exist. Of these we only took 
productivity differences into account whereas the pre-integration market sizes of 
the two markets under consideration were assumed to be identical, and the same 
assumption was made with respect to competitive wages10 (which in reality sub-
stantially vary between countries). Although it would be possible to relax some of 
these assumptions (for example by assuming different coefficients in the price 
equations - with larger values for smaller markets - at this point I will not try to 
make the model more realistic in this regard. But I want to hint at the changes 
which develop when the assumption of an uncoordinated wage policy or competi-
tion between firms is abandoned. 
Let me first turn to a co-ordinated wage policy, with firms operating under condi-
tions of Cournot competition. A simple assumption is that now a common utility 
function, consisting of the unweighted two rents (wage sums) is maximised. 
Maximising such a function with respect to wA  and wB , and taking into account 
the constraints (24) and (25) gives as solution for the wage rates exactly the values 
of the pre-integration case. As we already know, these wage rates are higher than 
the wage rates in the case of an uncoordinated wage policy in an integrated market. 
For labour demand a co-ordinated wage policy under the aforementioned assump-
tions has the following solutions: 
(30)    L a
bA
***
=
3α
 
                                               
10
 Only to simplify the equations we assumed additionally that competitive wages in both 
countries are zero. 
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(31)    L a
bB
***
=
3β  
When we compare these solutions with the two previously discussed cases, we see 
that employment is higher than in the pre-integration situation but lower than in the 
case of an uncoordinated wage policy. As wage rates are the same as in the pre-
integration situation and employment is higher, trade unions obviously gain from 
integration whereas firms’ profits are lowered. From the standpoint of the unions,  a 
co-ordinated wage policy is also to be preferred in the post-integration situation in 
comparison to the aforementioned case: Although employment is lower than in the 
uncoordinated case, both unions’ utility is higher, assuming that utility is equally 
distributed between the unions.  
It is quite obvious that with the simple model which has been used further constel-
lations  can be analysed. For example, we can analyse what happens when the 
country with the lower wage rate (in our case B) tries to catch-up with the high-
wage-and-productivity country without a corresponding larger increase in produc-
tivity. Without going into the details of this case it is quite clear that for the country 
with the expansive wage policy wage unit costs deteriorate and a reduction in inter-
national competitiveness will take place. At least within the boundaries of the sim-
ple model we are discussing, employment will be lower and the trade union in the 
low-wage country has to decide if an expansive wage policy is really worthwhile. 
This can be modelled by using an utility function UB  which selects the maximal 
value of the wage policies which the union has at its disposal. 
The opposite case is that of wage dumping: here, it is not the low-wage country 
which tries to catch up with the high-wage country, it is rather the high-productivity 
country which wants to gain in international competitiveness, for example by 
adopting the (lower) wages of the low-productivity country. Again I will not go 
into details. But it is quite obvious that the relative decline in labour unit costs of 
country A will improve its international competitiveness and, under the assump-
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tions of our simple model, the employment situation. Whether lower wage rates 
and higher employment result in a higher value of unions’ rents seems to be an 
open question. For our simple model, however, it can be shown that both unions 
achieve a lower utility than in the case of a productivity-oriented wage policy. The 
situation becomes even worse for unions when they enter into a competition of un-
dercutting. This form of competition may result in the complete disappearance of 
any union rent, while union wages become equal to the competitive wage. The 
same holds true when, contrary to the assumption made up to now, a collusion be-
tween the two firms take place. When firm-level co-operation results in a division 
of markets we are back to the pre-integration situation which has been shown to be 
inferior even for firms in comparison to post-integration with uncoordinated wage 
policy. But without market division what counts is that the bargaining situation of 
the (now single) firm is improved. Huizinga (1993) characterised the situation as a 

Bertrand-style wage setting game  , with union wages equal to the competitive wage 
as the outcome. 
In Table 3 the cases we discussed in greater detail are summarised. 
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Table 3: Pre- and Post-Integration Constellations 
 Pre-
Integra-
tion 
Post-
Integration: 
Uncoordi-
nated Wage 
Policy 
Post-
Integration 
(3) in com-
parison 
with Pre-
Integration  
+ respec-
tive vari-
able higher  
-respective 
variable 
lower 
o un-
changed: 
Post-
Integration 
Co-
ordinated 
Wage Pol-
icy 
Post-
Integration 
(5) Com-
parison 
with Pre-
Integration 
Co-ordinated 
Wage Policy 
in Compari-
son with Un-
coordinated 
Wage Policy 
(Post-
Integration) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Wage Rate A aα
2
 
aα
3
 
- 
aα
2
 
0 + 
Wage Rate B aβ
2
 
aβ
3
 
- 
aβ
2
 
0 + 
Employment A a
b4 α
 
4
9
a
bα
 
+ a
b3α
 
+ - 
Employment B a
b4 β
 
4
9
a
bβ
 
+ a
b3β
 
+ - 
Profit A a
b
2
16
 
8
81
2a
b
 
+ a
b
2
18
 
- - 
Profit B a
b
2
16
 
8
81
a
b
 
+ a
b
2
18
 
- - 
Price A 3
4
a
 
5
9
a
 
- 
2
3
a  - + 
Price B 3
4
a
 
5
9
a
 
- 
2
3
a  - + 
Union Utility A a
b
2
8
 
4
27
2a
b
 
+ a
b
2
6
 
+ + 
Union Utility B a
b
2
8
 
4
27
2a
b
 
+ a
b
2
6
 
+ + 
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4. Some Concluding Remarks 
Let me now draw some conclusions. It goes without saying that the partial equilib-
rium model which has been applied can produce only very limited insights. A more 
general study of the integration effects with regard to employment and wages has to 
be, of course, much broader in scope. Especially it has to take into account the ef-
fects on investment, innovation and economies of scale which may be triggered by 
the process of integration. Unfortunately, they are anything but clear. 
Although this investigation is only a very modest one which can only offer very 
limited insights, my claim is that it is not useless. It is a first step to investigate the 
integration effects in countries and among social economic groups. As we have not 
sufficiently distinguished between countries (which would ask for consideration of 
different market sizes, different competitive wages, etc.) the model is not particu-
larly suited to investigate the prospective winning or losing countries11. But we 
were able to learn something about winners and losers of different strategies in one 
country. Contrary to the usual opinion, it was shown that trade unions and firms 
can benefit by integration. But as most of us will guess, even without using a model 
there exist strategies which improve the situation of one group (in our model firm 
or a trade union) while deteriorating the other’s. Therefore recommendations such 
as, for example, Siebert’s (1998)  Do not Europeanise wage policy  are not per se 
justified because it is not the common interest of both groups to behave according 
to this rule but expresses the interest of one of the parties. Only if in the middle or 
long run all participants would lose by adopting such a strategy would such a rec-
ommendation be justified. But thoroughly convincing arguments or even proof of 
this does not exist. It is therefore necessary to ascertain who are the winners and 
losers of integration under different conditions. To offer a modest contribution with 
respect to this question was the intention of this contribution. 
                                               
11
 With highly different initial conditions (as they clearly do exist between EU member states as 
Table 1 verifies) this question gains in importance as the probability of unequally distributed 
gains and losses increases in this case. 
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